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THE GLASS SLIPPER APPROACH 
TO PROTECTING INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
OR 
WHEN THE SHOE FITS, WEAR IT 
Perry J. Saidmant 
Since I am the only patent lawyer on this opening panel, I think it is my 
duty to point out some of the virtues of patents for industrial designs, which 
are commonly referred to as "design patents." However, I want to assure 
you that my high regard for design patents did not come easily. I was 
among the nonbelievers several years ago when the opportunity to enforce a 
client's design rights first presented itself to me. It was a unique challenge 
because, like most patent lawyers, I had spent most of my career obtaining 
and enforcing utility patents. I Just so we can get this straight at the outset, 
for those of you who may be unfamiliar with the jargon, utility patents are 
the most popular form of patents in the United States and are what most 
people think of when they think of a patent. Utility patents cover lasers, 
computers, instant cameras, and all sorts of structural and functional tech-
nology. In contrast, a design patent2 protects the ornamental appearance of 
a product without regard to how it works. 
Several years ago, like many other patent lawyers, I considered recom-
mending a design patent to a client only when a utility patent was not avail-
able. Nobody spent any time teaching us about design patents in law school. 
No great law review articles were written about design patents. Yale Law 
School Professor Ralph Brown, who is on today's panel, wrote a sixty-four 
page article on design protection in 1987.3 In fact, his article was cited by 
the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,lnc.4 How-
ever, only three pages of his article were addressed to design patents.s The 
rest were devoted to copyright6 and trade dress law,7 which are the other 
two ways of protecting designs. In addition, the Supreme Court has not 
adjudicated a design patent case in almost 100 years. 8 
© Copyright 1991, Perry 1. Saidman. 
t B.S.E.E., 1967, George Washington University; M.S.E., 1968, University of Pennsylva-
nia; 1.0 ... 1973, George Washington University. Design lawyer, SAIDMAN DesignLaw 
GROUP. 
I. Utility patents are granted for any "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
combination of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," 35 US.c. § 101 
(1988),· providing the invention meets the requirements under the patent laws. 35 
US.c. §§ 102-103 (1988). 
2. 35 US.C. § 171 (1988). 
3. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987). 
4. 489 US. 141, 167 (1989). 
5. Brown, supra note 3, at 1355-57. 
6. [d. at 1344-55 . 
. 7. [d. at 1357-86. 
8. In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court heard three cases dealing with design patents. 
See Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 US. 244 (1894); Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 US. 
674 (1893); Gorham Co. v. White, 81 US. (14 Wall.) 511(1871). Since that time, the 
Supreme Court has not adjudicated a case dealing primarily with a design patent issue. 
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Design patents were not understood well by the chemists, electronics 
engineers, physicists, and mechanical and industrial engineers who formed 
the bulk of patent attorneys. After all, their primary interests were in tech-
nology and utility patents. There were few court decisions on design pat-
ents and many judges professed a lack of understanding in evaluating design 
patents. Several statistical analyses on design patents cited high failure 
rates in court. For example, one article said that seven of every ten design 
patents were held invalid from 1964 to 1983.9 Professor Brown, in the three 
pages of his article that were devoted to design patents, professed he could 
not provide an explanation for the high failure rate. After listing the virtues 
of design patents, the good professor said, "Yet, despite these seeming cre-
dentials, design patent remains a Cinderella who never goes to the ball." 10 
Well Cinderella, my name is Prince Charming, and do I have a glass slipper 
for you! 
Let me share with you how I got into the glass slipper business. As I 
sat down several years ago and tried to pick out one form of protection for 
my client's ornamental design, the options were only three. I therefore vis-
ited with Cinderella, the design patent, and her two step-sisters, trade dress 
and copyright. Now, copyright was beautiful; in fact, you could say she was 
a work of art. Trade dress was also very appealing; you should have seen 
her dress. But after I scraped away the soot and cinders caked on by years 
of neglect, Cinderella the design patent turned out to be the loveliest of all. 
Yes, I fell in love with Cinderella and felt that it was high time to bring this 
black sheep of the family out of the closet and into the open where others 
could appreciate her beauty. 
It is my view that in most instances a design patent is the preferred 
mode of protection in the United States for the appearance of a consumer 
product. Having said that, let me assure you that this conclusion is not 
based on emotion alone. It is based on logic, facts, and legal analysis. 
There are, however, certain situations in which trade dress protection would 
be preferred, and there are instances, albeit fewer, where copyright protec-
tion is preferable. Now, this presentation cannot encompass an exhaustive 
analysis of the comparative virtues of design patents, trade dress, and copy-
right in the limited time given to me this morning. We have heard and will 
hear much more about these three sisters as the conference progresses. It is 
also likely that we will hear from others who do not share my view of Cin-
derella's beauty. But now, it is my turn to state the case for design patents, 
and I will leave it for you to judge whether I am speaking of a fairy tale or of 
a fable that has a moral to it. 
9. Lindgren. The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? Twenty Years of 
Design Patent Litigation Since Compeo v. Day-Brite Lighting. Inc., and Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CITY u.L. REV. 195,261 (1985); see also Walter, A Ten 
Year Survey o/Design Patent Litigation, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 389 (1953). 
10. Brown, supra note 3, at 1356. 
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I am going to begin by first discussing the pros and cons of copyright 
protection for industrial designs. Then I will do a similar analysis for trade 
dress protection. Finally, I will discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of design patent protection. 
First there is sister copyright. The advantages of copyright are that it 
is quick (you get protection upon creation) I I and inexpensive, 12 and it lasts a 
long time.13 In addition, federal courts are quite accustomed to copyright 
litigation, 14 although there is no central court of appeals to resolve disputes 
that may arise from different lower court interpretations. Another advan-
tage is that the United States has just entered into a treaty known as the 
Berne Convention for the Protection. of Literary and Artistic Works IS which 
does not require copyright notice on the product in order for copyright pro-
tection to begin.16 Some disadvantages of copyright are that damages 
awards are generally less in copyright cases than in patent cases,17 and the 
copyright owner has the burden of proving that the defendant copied the 
protected design. 18 
A major problem with copyright protection is the separability require-
ment. 19 As a practical matter, this requirement restricts copyright 
11. A copyright is created in any original work of authorship when it is first "fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression." 17 US.C. § 102(a) (1988). "A work is 'fixed' in a 
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment. . . is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period 
of more than transitory duration." Id. § 101. 
12. An initial application for copyright registration can be made for as little as ten dollars. 
Id. § 708(a)(1). 
13. The duration of a copyright can continue for the life of the author plus fifty years after 
the author's death. Id. § 302(a). Specific rules apply to copyright duration depending 
upon the status of the author(s) and the date when the work is created. See id. 
§§ 302-305. 
14. Federal copyright laws have an origin in our Constitution which states: "The Congress 
shall have Power ... (t)o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries." US. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Copyright law has· evolved 
from both statutory and common law origins. See generally 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON CoPYRfGHT § J.0l (1990). 
15. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, as 
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 3· UNESCO & WlPO, CoPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES 
OF THE WORLD, Berne Conv. (Item H) (1987) [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also 
17 US.c. §§ 101-810 (1988). 
16. The lack of any requirement of notice is based in the Berne Convention's language that 
"the enjoyment and the exercise of [copyright] shall not be subject to any formality" 
between participating countries. Berne Convention, supra note 15, at art. 5(2). 
17. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, statutory damages can be as low as $500. 17 US.C. 
§ 504(c)(I) (1988). 
18. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 "F.2d Ill, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). 
19. The separability requirement requires the design of an article to be separate from any 
functional considerations before it is capable of copyright protection. As a reSUlt, 
copyright protection is not available for any design that cannot exist separate from its 
function. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988); see, e.g., Esquire. Inc. v. Ringer; 591 F.2d796, 803 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Carol Barnhart. Inc. V. Economy 
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protection to product designs that are more like a work of art than a con-
sumer product. While many courts interpret and apply the separability 
requirement in different ways, I am going to tell you what the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held in a recent case involving the famous 
RIBBON bicycle rack. The case is Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pacific Lumber Co. 20 The RIBBON rack, which won an award in 1980 from 
the Industrial Designers Society of America for its striking design, was 
inspired from a wire sculpture. The court applied the "conceptual separa-
bility" tese' which states that an industrial design is protectable by copy-
right only when the design is conceptually separable from its utilitarian 
aspects. A design is not conceptually separable from its utilitarian aspects, 
the court said, if the form and function of the article are intertwined. 22 
This clearly does not square with the real world of industrial design, where 
form and function are ideally blended during the design process, and the 
court knew this. In deciding that the RIBBON rack was not a prope~ subject 
for a copyright, the court said: 
Judging from the awards the rack has received, it would seem in 
fact that Brandir has achieved with the RIBBON Rack the highest 
goal of modern industrial design, that is, the harmonious fusion 
of function and aesthetics. Thus there remains no artistic element 
of the RIBBON Rack that can be identified as separate and is 
"capable of existing independently, of, the utilitarian aspects of 
the article."23 
The result of the holding in Brandir is that our copyright maiden looks more 
and more like one of Cinderella's lazy sisters, or perhaps an artsy sister, who 
went to the ball first, but whom very few have asked to dance. We will see 
that our beauty Cinderella, the design patent, does not suffer from this flaw. 
Now I will briefly discuss the pros and cons of trade dress law. Trade 
dress law is a branch of trademark law. Trade dress includes the following 
characteri$tics of a product: color or combination of colors, size, shape, tex-
ture, weight, and graphics. 24 The area where trade dress protection is very 
valuable is where the product design or trade dress is so distinctive that the 
public has come to associate the features of the design with a particular 
source for the product. Generally, this kind of distinctiveness requires long 
and widespread use of the product. This, of course, cannot happen over-
night. 
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,418 (2d Cir; 1985); see also I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 
supra note 14,.§ 2.08(8). 
20. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
21. Id. at 1144. 
22.· Id. 
23. rd. at 1147-48 . 
. 24. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,980 (11th Cir. 1983); I J. 
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:1 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 
: 1990). 
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One major advantage of trade dress protection is that registration of the 
trade dress is not necessary to obtain relief in court. 25 Another advantage 
is that courts are very accustomed to litigation involving trade dress and 
trademarks. Courts are familiar with the subject matter and have developed 
an expertise in trademark principles. 26 Since trademark law is based on 
avoiding consumer confusion, it is a very appealing type of case to try 
before judges and juries. 27 Another advantage is that the test for trade dress 
infringement is quite broad. The trade dress owner need only prove that the 
infringing product is likely to create confusion in the marketplace as to the 
source or origin of the product. 28 
One of the disadvantages of trade dress protection is the requirement in 
a majority of courts of proving secondary meaning. 29 Secondary meaning 
is a doctrine which says that through long and continuous use of the trade 
dress in the marketplace, the user has created a secondary meaning in addi-
tion to the primary meaning of the product. The secondary meaning occurs 
when a consumer looks at the product and, in addition to knowing what kind 
of product it is, associates a particular source with that ~roduct so as to 
enable her to distinguish that product source from another. 0 
A good example of secondary meaning is the Mogen David wine bottle 
which, when first introduced, was just another different wine bottle. 
Through long and extensive use and advertising, the shape of the bottle 
became known to consumers as belonging to Mogen David. Thus, over 
time it acquired the distinctiveness necessary to give it valuable trade dress 
protection against other bottles which would likely cause confusion. 31 This 
acquired distinctiveness is known as secondary meaning. Do you remem-
ber the RIBBON bicycle rack? Although Brandir lost on the copyright 
claim, the court reversed the summary judgment against Brandir and 
remanded the case to enable Brandir to make a case for secondary 
25. Trade dress protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act is available without federal 
registration. 15 U.S.c. § I I 25(a) (1988). 
26. The general federal law regarding trademarks has been focused and refined since the 
passing of the Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act). 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1127 
(1988). In addition to the federal statute, many states have their own trademark stat-
utes including antidilution statutes. See generally UNITED STATES TRADEMARK AsS'N, 
STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw (1988). 
27. Nonexperts can assume the role of the consumer and obtain a sense of whether or not 
two products are confusingly similar. The question of likelihood of confusion is, how-
ever, a mixed question of fact and law. See Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 
841 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1988). 
28. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,841 (9th Cir. 1987). 
29. See id. at 843; American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 
1141 (3d Cir. 1986); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. 1. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772 
(9th Cir. 1981); Kusan, Inc. v. Fairway Siding Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1202, 1206 
(D. Mass. 1988); Soft Sheen Prods., Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 408, 415 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987). 
30. I 1. McCARTHY, supra note 24, § 8:2. 
31. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), a/I'd. 372 F.2d 539 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
172 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
meaning. 32 Although it is very valuable when you have it, secondary mean-
ing takes time to develop and a lot of money to prove. In addition, it may 
not be available for the first few years the product is being sold, which can 
be the most critical years for protecting the product, especially when the 
product life is short. 
Another disadvantage of trade dress protection is that it does not nec-
essarily protect or reward the originator of the design. Trade dress protec-
tion is directed toward protecting the user and promoter of the design,33 
who is not necessarily the original designer. If the product is not protected 
by a patent, and has not achieved protectable trade dress status, anyone can 
copy it from the original designer without liability.34 This would not be 
possible under patent law because only the original and first designer can 
obtain the design patent. 35 
Another disadvantage of trade dress is the federal courts' inconsistent 
application of trade dress principles. This has created a situation similar to 
the one that existed in the patent area ten years ago. The circuit courts of 
appeals have appellate jurisdiction over trade dress cases36 and each circuit 
may apply different trade dress principles. In addition, the Supreme Court 
rarely accepts a trade dress case to resolve conflict between the circuits. 37 
Right now, as a good example, the rules on secondary meaning differ from 
circuit to circuit. 38 Thus, it is very difficult to advise your client, who is a 
national distributor of unique products, whether its trade dress has achieved 
protectable status. Factors include where the infringement occurs, where 
suit is brought, and where the case is eventually heard. Thus, trade dress is 
another one of Cinderella's sisters, who is probably not as lazy as copyright. 
32. Brandir Int'I, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987). 
33. Trade dress is generally protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. 
§ I I 25(a) (1988). A remedy is available to any party injured by a competitor's "false 
designation of origin" of its product, including a false designation implied by the prod-
uct's trade dress. Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985). 
34. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234. 238-39 (1964); Sears. 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). 
35. 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). 
36. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under 
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection. copyrights and trade-
marks." 28 U.S.C. § I 338(a) (1988); see T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d 
Cir. 1964) (discussing the principles for determining whether an action arises under the 
intelle~tual property statutes), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). Most trade dress 
claims are grounded in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and. therefore, are subject to federal 
jurisdiction. The United States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to hear all appeals 
from final decisions made in the district courts. 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1988). 
37. The most recent Supreme Court case addressing a dispute which involved a trade dress 
matter was Inwood Laboratories. Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
38. See, e.g., Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346,348-49 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(secondary meaning must be shown where the trade dress is not inherently distinctive); 
Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. 1. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (trade 
dress must be shown to be nonfunctional and have seconda~ meaning to be protec-
table); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985) (conclusive 
evidence of secondary meaning not required). 
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Trade dress is already at the ball and already has had quite a few dances 
because of her pretty dress. 
As I said, ten years ago the same situation was true for patent cases. 39 
One of the major requirements in getting a patent is that the invention must 
not have been obvious in view of everything that has been done before. 40 
Ten years ago, each of the circuit courts of appeals was applying different 
rules on the issue of obviousness. The cases were in total disarray and 
much money was spent on jockeying where a case was going to be heard 
rather than on the merits of the case itself. 41 Invalidity rates for utility pat-
ents ranged from 60% to 100%.42 To resolve these differences and improve 
the use of the patent system to protect technology, Congress created the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on October 1, 1982, 
giving it exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over all patent cases.43 
What has happened during the last six and one-half years is nothing 
short of a miracle. The Federal Circuit has created entirely new respect for 
the patent system and for patents. The desired uniformity and predictability 
in the patent law44 has finally come about. Now I am able to advise clients 
on the law on obviousness, irrespective of where the infringement occurs or 
which judge in which court might hear the case. Slowly but surely, the Fed-
eral Circuit is coming to grips with the many complex issues in patent law 
and is building up a storehouse of precedent according to which business-
men will be able to guide their actions for years to come. 
To get back to our Cinderella story, the creation of the Federal Circuit 
is quite analogous to turning the pumpkin of patent law into a magnificent 
legal coach for taking our design patent beauty, Cinderella, to the ball. The 
unique thing about this state of the art legal coach is that the coach is big 
enough, and strong enough, to take design patents along for the ride with 
our old friend, the utility patent. 
In a very real sense, the creation of our elegant coach, the Court of 
39. Before the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, patent litigation 
success varied from circuit to circuit. The specific purpose of the Federal Circuit was 
to "reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that 
exist in the administration of patent law," H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 
23 (1981); see Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
40. 35 U.S.c. § 103 (1988). 
41. For many interesting commentaries on the nonobvious standards applied by the courts 
in the 19705 and earlier, see NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTA. 
BILITY (1. Witherspoon ed. 1980) (papers compiled in commemoration of the silver 
anniversary of 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
42. See generally KAYTON, THE CRISIS OF LAw IN PATENTS (1970). 
43. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). The Federal 
Circuit hears appeals from patent applicants on the decisions of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1988), and appeals from federal district 
courts relating to patent matters. 28 U.S.C .. § 1295 (1988) .. 
44. For a discussion of the early concerns about the Federal Circuit, see Note, An Appraisal 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circui.l, 57 S. CAL. L. Rev. 30 I (1984). 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has resulted in a renaissance in the patent 
system. 45 The exceeding popularity of obtaining and enforcing utility pat-
ents has resulted in utility patents bootstrapping design patents because pat-
ent legislation applies to both types of patents.46 That, my friends, is one 
very good reason for taking a long and hard look at design patents. 
There is a definite time lag between the flowering of utility patents and 
the flowering of design patents. In other words, Cinderella is not yet 
accepted in all the best places. Why? Well, we all know that discrimina-
tion dies hard. It also makes sense in view of the fact that just over 300,000 
design patents have been granted in the United States, while the number of 
utility patents granted approaches 5,000,000. I think it is fair to say that if 
utility patents are obtained over ten times more frequently than design pat-
ents, then they are also litigated in approximately those proportions. As a 
result, the case law, the general mystique surrounding design patents, and 
the user sophistication of the design patent system all lag behind that of util-
ity patents. However, as I will note, these things are changing fast due to the 
presence of a particular section in the patent law (35 U.s.c. § 171) which 
says that the provisions of this law relating to utility patents shall apply 
equally to design patents.47 This means that all the great strides made by 
the Federal Circuit in cases concerning utility patents, also apply to design 
patents. Thus, the use of design patents is bound to become more predict-
able and reliable, which are the two main reasons for the establishment of 
the Federal Circuit in the first place. 
Design patents cover designs on many different types of articles48 such 
as buildings, lawn chairs, truck fenders, work desks, espresso makers, 
icons, fabrics, and car parts like starter adapters. Examples of design pat-
ents are shown below: 
45. See generally Saidman, Patents: There is Something New Under the Sun, BARRISTER 
52-55 (1987); Sobel, The Coun 0/ Appeals/or the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary 
Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 1087 (1988). 
46. The federal patent laws specify that all law relating to utility patents "shall apply to pat-
ents for designs." 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). As a result, the development of patent law 
doctrines from utility patent litigation directly applies to design patents. 
47. Id: see also Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423,1440 (Fed. Cu. 1984); 
R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496,498 n.3 (3d Cir. 1956). 
48. An inventor may apply for a design patent to protect "any new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture" under the statute. 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). The 
design itself is defined as the appearance created by the configuration andior the sur-
face ornamentation of the article. Gorham Co. v. White. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511. 
525-28 (1871); see also I D. CHISUM. PATENTS § I.04(2)[a) (1990). 
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U.S. Patent Jan. 24, 1989 Des. 299,540 
Building 
U.S. Patent Jan. 10, 1989 Des. 299,292 
Adjustable Armchair 
U.S. Patent Nov. 17, 1987 Des. 292,765 
~-.. 
Worktable or Similar Article 
176 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
u.s. Patent Nov. 8,1988 Des. 298,402 
Coffee Making Machine 
u.s. Patent Dec. 20, 1988 Des. 299,019-Y, 
--
Truck Fender 
u.s. Patent Oct. 18, 1988 Des. 298,144 
Icon/or Voice File or the Like 
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U.S. Patent Dec. 9, 1986 Des. 287,130 
Adapter Plate for Automobile Starters 
Design patents can cover the shape or configuration of a product, the 
surface decoration on a product,49 or a combination of shape and surface 
decoration. One major advantage is that a design patent is available without 
having to meet the copyright separability test and the trade dress secondary 
meaning test. Design patent laws are very protective of the designer; only 
the designer can legally apply for a design patent. so A true designer or a 
codesigner is one who conceives or contributes to the conception of the 
design elements of the product. SI 
Another advantage of design patents over both trade dress and copy-
right protection is that it is very easy to obtain a design patent on a single 
element or portion of a design, 52 as shown in the following examples. As 
long as the element itself meets the statutory tests of novelty, nonob-
viousness, and ornamentality, a design patent can be validly granted. S3 
49. Gorhllm, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 525 ("The appearance may be the result of peculiarity of 
configuration. or of ornament alone or of both conjointly. . . . "). 
50. 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). 
51. 35 U.S.c. §§ 115-116 (1988). 
52. In 1980, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (predecessor to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit) held that design patents are possible for protection of part of an 
article's overall design. In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
53. 35 U.S.c. § 103 (1988). 
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We have already discussed the general advantage provided by our ele-
gant legal coach, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Here are 
some specific examples which apply to both design and utility patents. 
A design patent, once issued, is presumed valid by law. 54 This means 
that someone who is accused of infringement has a very high burden to 
prove that the design patent was improperly granted. Another advantage is 
the ability of the patent owner to stop the accused infringer during the early 
stages of the lawsuit by obtaining a preliminary injunction.55 A prelimi-
nary injunction is an order issued by the judge which requires the infringer 
to immediately cease and desist from further manufacture, use or sale of the 
infringing product. If one has a good case of infringement, one will more 
likely than not get the injunction.56 
It is also significant that the Federal Circuit is often reluctant to post-
pone an injunction pending the outcome of an appeal. 57 One good example 
is Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak CO.,58 where Kodak failed to obtain a 
delay of the injunction granted to Polaroid pending Kodak's appeal to the 
Federal Circuit. 59 This put Kodak out of the instant camera business long 
before its appeal was decided. Thus, the ability to obtain an injunction, and 
have it stick, gives the design patent holder enormous leverage against a 
would-be infringer. 
Turning to the area of damages, there is a special damage provision in 
the patent law which says, uniquely, that the owner of a design patent is enti-
tled to the total profits of the infringer.60 Even in a case where the design 
patent covers only one small element of a product, the holder is entitled to 
the infringer's total profit on sales of the whole product.61 Also, damages 
54. The presumption of validity found in 35 U.S.c. § 282 (1988) applies to both utiliiy and 
design patents. See Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
55. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988) authorizes courts to grant injunctions where equity requires. A 
preliminary injunction is available when the movant can satisfy four criteria: likeli-
hood of its success on the merits; public interest favoring issuance of the. injunction; 
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted: and a balance of equities in its favor. 
See T.l. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consolidated Medical Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646,647 
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Smith Inn, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir.), eerr. denied, 
464 U.S. 996 (1983). 
56. See Designs for Leisure, Ltd. v. Murrey & Sons Co., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1159 (C.D. 
Cal. 1988); American Antenna Corp. V. Wilson Antenna, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 924 (D. 
Nev. 1988); Whiuar Indus., Ltd. V. Superior Indus. Infl Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68 
(C.o. Cal. 1986). 
57. See Cordis Corp. V. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. 
Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.), eer'. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983). 
58. 641 F. Supp. 828 (D. Mass. 1985), affd, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.), eert. denied, 479 
U.S. 850 (1986). 
59. Polaroid, 641 F. Supp. at 876-77. 
60. 35 U.S.c. § 289 (1988). 
61. Section 289 makes an infringer liable "to the extent of his total profiC' resulting from 
sales of the infringing article. Id. Usually, the courts define "profit" using the incre-
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begin to accrue from the day the patent is issued, so long as the product is 
marked with the design patent number. 62 The infringer is not required to 
have actual notice of the design patent,63 nor will his plea that the infringe-
ment was accidental be of any help to him. 64 
The doctrine cif willful infringement has given.patent owners enormous 
leverage against would-be infringers in both design and utility patent cases. 
If an infringement is willful, the infringer could be held responsible for the 
payment of up to triple the regular damages, plus the patent owner's attor-
ney's fees. The leading case from the Federal Circuit, Underwater Devices 
Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen CO.,65 held that one who is on actual notice of 
another's patent has a duty to determine whether or not he is infringing. 
This duty includes obtaining an opinion from a patent attorney before the 
initiation of any possible infringing activity. The opinion should be in writ-
ing, and be based on a comprehensive evaluation by patent counsel of the 
file history of the patent, all prior patents, and the allegedly infringing prod-
uct. 66 If a defendant has not discharged his duty to investigate, or has not 
followed his attorney's competent advice, then he can be liable to the patent 
owner for double or triple damages61 plus attorney fees. 68 
Some of Cinderella's mean stepmothers have presented the disadvan-
tages of design patents, and I will briefly address their four major arguments. 
The first complaint is that the standard of obviousness is too difficult to 
apply in the case of design patents. This standard provides that a design pat-
ent cannot be granted if the illustrated design would have been obvious to a 
designer of ordinary skill in view of all earlier designs. 69 Now I notice that 
later in the program we have an expert from the Patent Office who is going to 
speak more precisely on the application of this standard. Critics have said 
that determining obviousness of a design patent is unpredictable, very subjec-
tive, and must rely on the highly opinionated nature of designers as expert wit-
nesses. 10 Let me make three points in response to these concerns. 
mental income approach. See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 
745 F.2d 11,22 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instr. Co., 836 F.2d 
1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
62. 35 US.c. § 287 (1988). 
63. Notice to the infringer by the patent owner is required when the patented article is not 
properly marked. Id. Proper marking, however, serves as constructive notice. See 
Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
64. There is no requirement of intent fora finding of infringement. 35 U.S.c. § 271(a) (1988). 
65. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
66. Id. at 1389-90; see also Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
67. 35 u.s.c. § 284 (1988). 
68. Reasonable attorney's fees are available in exceptional cases. 35 U.S.c. 285 (1988); see 
Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Avia 
Group In!'I, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
69. See In re Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Nalbandian. 661 F.2d 1214, 
1217 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
70. See Fryer, Industrial Design Protection in the United States 0/ America-Present Situa-
tion and Plans/or Revision, 27 INDUS. PRop. 115. 118-19 (1988). 
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First, the question of obviousness of a design is like the question of 
infringement. In determining infringement, someone must visually com-
pare the accused product to the claimed design and determine if they are 
substantially the same. It is ultimately subjective, although there are objec-
tive signposts along the way, just like the question of obviousness. 71 The 
question of infringement is no more subjective in a design patent case then 
in a trade dress 72 or copyright action,73 but no one is complaining about 
subjectivity or unpredictability in those areas. 
Next, it is easier to satisfy the obviousness test in a design patent than a 
utility patent because in a utility patent there are many limiting words 
describing the use, function, structure, and operation of the invention.74 
The utility patent examiner uses all of those words to reject the utility pat-
ent application as obvious. [n a design patent application, by contrast, there 
are generally no limiting words. The design is described only by the draw-
ings,7S and it is more difficult for a design patent examiner to combine prior 
designs to reject the patent based on obviousness.76 
Finally, it is only by subjecting design patent applications to a rigorous 
examination77 on obviousness by the highly skilled and experienced design 
71. In determining obviousness, a court analyzes the following four factors: (I) the scope 
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claim at 
issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonob-
viousness (e.g., commercial success, long-felt need, widespread copying, etc.). Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 US. I, 17 (1966); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 
F.2d 1423, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
72. In trade dress actions, the standard for infringement is taken from trademark law. As 
such, the basic requirement is likelihood of confusion. 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (1988). 
See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (91h Cr. 1987); Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 
1979); Schering Corp. v. Schering Aktiengesellschaft, 667 F. Supp. 175, 187 (D.N.J. 
1987). 
73. A plaintiff must show two elements in a copyright infringement action: ownership of 
the copyright by the plaintiff, and copying (substantial similarity) by the defendant. 
See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 1189, 1192 (2d Cir. 1985). 
See generally 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.01. 
74. Section 112 provides that "Ihe specification shall conclude with one or more claims par-
ticularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invenlion." 35 US.C. § 112 (1988). In design patent applications, no 
description, other Ihan a reference to the drawing of Ihe design, is required. 37 CF.R. 
§ 1.153 (1990). Only a single claim is allowed. In re Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391, 396 
(CCP.A. 1959), cert. denied, 362 US. 903 (1960). 
75. 37 CF.R. § 1.153 (1990). 
76. The Federal Circuit stated the difficulty of finding obviousness in ornamental designs 
in In reCho: 
To support a rejection of a design patent application under 35 US.c. 
§ 103, the teachings of references must be such as to have suggested the over-
all appearance of the claimed design. Thus, if the combined teachings sug-
gest only components of the claimed design but nol its overall appearance, a 
rejection under section 103 is inappropriate. 
813 F.2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 
77. 35 U.S.C § 131 (1988); see PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COM· 
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patent examiners, and by having the claimed designs survive such examina-
tion, that the tremendous advantages provided by the presumption of valid-
ity are obtained. 78 There is no substantive examination of a copyright,79 
and the trade dress examination is very limited. 80 
A second complaint with regard to design patents is that the issue of 
functionality kills many design patents. If a patented design is functional, 
then it does not meet the legal requirement that limits design patents to orna-
mental designs. 81 Many courts have had problems distinguishing the inher-
ent function of a product with the function of the design of or on the prod-
uct. 112 This is a critical distinction because virtually all products which are 
the subject of design patents have a function; otherwise, they would not be 
on the market. The question, therefore, should not be whether the product 
is functional, but whether the design appearing on or of the product is func-
tional. 83 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has yet to adopt a sensible and 
easily applied test to determine whether a patented design is legally func-
tional and therefore invalid. 84 
Over the years, most of the attention has been focused on how the test is 
worded,85 and not on how the test is applied, or on the underlying principles 
of why the test exists in the first place. The reason why we have a doctrine 
of functionality in design patents, as well as in trade dress and copyright 
cases, is that you ought not be able to obtain by a design patent, a trade 
dress registration, or a copyright registration, that which Congress only 
MERCE. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE Ch. 1500 (5th ed. 1983 & Supp. 
1987) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.J. 
78. Design patents enjoy the presumption of validity created in 35 US.C. § 282 (1988) by 
incorporation. 35 US.c. § 171 (1988). 
79. Federal copyright registration only requires a deposit of the work with the Copyright 
Office. 17 U.s.c. § 408 (1988). No examination of prior art is required. 
80. The Patent and Trademark Office will conduct a comparison with only federally regis-
tered trade dress before a federal trade dress registration application is allowed. 15 
U.S.c. § 1052(d) (1988). 
81. Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics. Inc .• 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Carletti. 
328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
82. See Power Controls. 806 F.2d at 240; In re Zahn. 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980); Pensa. 
Inc. v. L.A. Gear CaI.. Inc .• 4 US.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1016 (C.O. Cal. 1987). affd sub nom. 
Avia Group Int'l. Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal.. Inc .• 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
83. "However. a distinction exists between the functionality of an article or features thereof 
and the functionality of the particular design of such article or features thereof that per-
form a function. Were it not true. it would not be possible to obtain a design patent on a 
utilitarian article of manufacture." Avia Group Int·l. Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal.. Inc .• 853 
F.2d 1557. 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
84. The Federal Circuit has supported a "primarily" functional test by quoting liberally 
from C.C.P.A. cases espousing a "solely" functional standard. See Lee v. Dayton-Hud-
son Corp .• 838 F.2d 1186. 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Power Controls. 806 F.2d at 
238); see also Carleni, 323 F.2d at 1022; In re Garbo. 287 F.2d 192. 193-94 (C.C.P.A. 
1961). See generally. Saidman & Hintz, The Doctrine of Functionality in Design Patent 
Cases. 19 U. DALT. L. REV. 352 (1989) (this symposium). 
85. See Bergstrom v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 496·F. Supp. 476,489 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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intended be obtainable by a utility patent.1!6 A competitor has the right to 
copy the unprotected function in your product. 87 The only way to protect 
function is to obtain a utility patent. If you do not have a utility patent, you 
cannot stop a competitor from making a product having the same or similar 
function. 
The question for us becomes: What will the competitor's product look 
like? If your unprotected function can be embodied by a product that has a 
different appearance, then your design patent will be valid to protect your 
product's specific design appearance. If, on the other hand, the only way of 
expressing that unprotected function is by your product's particular design, 
then your design patent will be invalid because the function has dictated the 
design, and there is no way for a competitor to copy the unprotected func-
tion without copying the design. 
Therefore, I submit that the test for design patent functionality should 
be whether the design is dictated by function, and a court applying that test 
should receive evidence concerning the availability of alternative designs 
that incorporate substantially the same function. If such alternative designs 
exist, or can be devised, that do not infringe the design patent, then the 
design patent is valid. If no such alternative designs exist, the design ~atent 
is invalid for functionality. This test has been used by several courts, 8 but 
has not been fully embraced by the Federal Circuit as the test for functional-
ity in design patent law. It is an eminently reasonable test, which is suscep-
tible to being proven by evidence and very capable of being evaluated prop-
erly by a judge or jury. . 
A third complaint involves the length of time it takes to obtain a design 
patent; up to two and one-half to three years is common. However, there 
have long existed rules in the Patent Office which al.low a patent applicant to 
expedite an examination of his application.89 We have been able to obtain 
design patents for some clients in under six months from the time of filing. 90 
This, of course, is a real plus when the product is very popular upon intro-
duction and is being knocked-off immediately. The extra expense neces-
86. See Corletti, 328 E2d at 1022. 
87. See Bonito Boats~ Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 141 (1989); Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc .• 376 US. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co.. 376 US. 225 (1964). 
88; Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear CaL, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (cit-
ing Pensa, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 4 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 
1987); Celebrity, Inc. v. A & B Instrument Co., 573 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 US. 824 (1978); Moore v. Stewart, 600 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Con-
tico Int'l. Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 506 E Supp. 1072. 1075 (E.D. 
Mo.). affd. 665 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1981); J. G. Furniture Co. v. Litton Business Sys., 
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 380.388 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
89. A design patent application may be expedited upon filing the referenced petition and 
submitting a required fee. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (1990). This process is known as a "Peti-
tion to Make Special." M.P.E.P.. supra note 77, § 708.02, at 700-35.-
90. For example. United States Patent No. Des. 297,181 was issued in less than six months. 
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sary to obtain expedited examination is generally well worth it, and no 
adverse effect on validity of the resulting patent is evident. Of course, if the 
design is not popular, then there is no reason to expedite examination, and 
there is nothing wrong with letting the patent application go its normal 
course. 
The final major criticism of design patents is their high cost. Obvi-
ously, this is an important consideration, especially for companies that put 
out dozens or hundreds of designs per year and perhaps do not wish to spend 
$1,000 or more to get each one patented. I submit that for important 
designs, it is well worth the money. However, there are ways to prioritize 
expenses to get design patents on only the most important designs. There 
are also ways to preserve rights on even 50 to 100 new products relatively 
cheaply for a short period of time while the commercial success of the 
designs can be evaluated. 
Well, things are looking up. There is my glass slipper. Since the shoe 
fits, hopefully Cinderella will wear it, and perhaps we can live happily ever 
after. 
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APPENDIX 
Recent Design Patent Cases-Statistical Analysis 
Since all of the previous statistical studies focus on design patent cases 
decided before the Federal Circuit's gospel filtered down, I concentrated on 
the three years from January I, 1986, to April 19, 1989. I found some 
interesting numbers that should be encouraging to design patent owners, or 
at least not discouraging. 
First, I looked at reported decisions on design patent preliminary 
injunctions, and they are encouraging. Out of five reported decisions, the 
district courts granted a preliminary injunction four times, for an excellent 
success rate of eighty percent. Table I below summarizes the five cases.91 
Next, I looked at reported decisions of the federal district courts that 
actually decided the issues of validity and infringement. During this period 
of time, twelve design patents were litigated.92 In all cases, the question of 
validity was decided. Of the twelve, the court found the design patents 
invalid in five. Thus, the mortality rate was only about forty-two percent. 
The converse, of course, is that fifty-eight percent of the design patents liti-
gated were held valid. This is an excellent success rate. One might, at first 
blush, actually expect only about a fifty percent success rate, since that is 
about the rate of utility patent success, and since presumably only closely 
contested cases get litigated and reported. 
I then took a closer look at the five holdings of invalidity to determine 
the grounds the courts used to invalidate the design patents. I tried to deter-
mine whether there was something about design patents that was either 
inherently suspect or whether design patent issues were uniquely difficult to 
resolve, as suggested by some commentators. In two of the five, the design 
patents were invalidated because the designs were found to be on sale over 
one year prior to the date of application, violating 35 U.S.c. § 102(b).93 The 
"on sale" bar applies equally to utility patents and design patents.94 Thus, 
in these two cases, the fact that the patents were design patents did not make 
91. Chemlawn Services was affirmed without opinion by the Federal Circuit. Chemlawn 
Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc., 856 F.2d 202 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
92. Several of the cases that decided validity and infringement issues were affirmed on 
appeal. See Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 654 F. Supp. 90 (C.D. Cal. 
1987), affd, 12 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Pensa, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., 
Inc., 4 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (C.D. Cal. 1987), affd sub nom. Avia Group Int'IInc. v. 
L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 666 
F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Tenn. 1987), affd, 838 F.2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1988); FMC Corp. v. 
Hennesey Indus. Inc., 650 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. III. 1986), aff d in pari, vacated in part, 
836 F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
93. Schreiber Mfg. Co. v. Saft Am., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Mich. 1989); DTA Corp. v. 
J & J Enters., 715 F. Supp. 290 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
94. 35 US.c. § I02(b) (1988). 
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them inherently suspicious or weak. In Pioneer Photo and Neo-Art, the 
court opinions were, to be kind, less than models of legal clarity. In only 
one of the twelve cases, Black & Decker, was the design patent held invalid 
for obviousness with a cognent legal analysis. 
The infringement issue was decided eight times. I am reluctant to 
draw conclusions from statistics on infringement holdings because each 
infringement is so factually different. But of the eight, four were found 
infringed, for a success rate of fifty percent. Of the four noninfringement 
holdings, one was in the case where obviousness was also found, Black & 
Decker, and the other three simply did not infringe. I cannot quarrel with 
the outcomes. The results are. summarized in Table 2 below. 
The Federal Circuit reviewed seven design patents in five cases during 
this time period. In every case, it affirmed the lower court's findings on 
validity and infringement. On validity, it upheld four of four design patents, 
for a one hundred percent validity record. On infringement, it found four of 
seven design patents infringed, for a success rate· of fifty-seven percent. 
One reason that the courts upheld the lower courts' findings of four infringe-
ments and three noninfringements is the requirement of demonstrating that 
the lower court was clearly erroneous in order to obtain a reversal. 9S This is 
a very high burden for the party who loses on the infringement issue in the 
lower court. On validity, the Federal Circuit affirmed in all cases, which 
illustrates the power of the presumption of validity. The infringer has the 
burden of overcoming the presumption of validity at trial by clear and con-
vincing evidence,96 which is also a difficult standard to meet. The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the lower court in each case that the infringer had failed 
to meet this burden. These results are summarized in Table 3 below. 
Although it is clear that the number of cases decided both in the district 
courts and the Federal Circuit is not statistically significant, the above 
results indicate a shift in recent times in favor of design patent enforcement 
and help counteract the poor statistics reported for prior time periods. 
95. Lee. 838 F.2d at 1187 (citing Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. 
Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986». 
96. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984). 
TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURrS-PRELlMINARY INJUNCTIONS (P.I.) (Jan. 1, 1986 to April 19, 1989) 
DESIGN 
PAT. NO. 
1. 267,248 
2. 285,987 
3. 238,671 
4. 255,449 
5. 259,579 
0= denied 
1 = granted 
CASE NAME 
Whittar Indus., Ltd. v. Superior Indus. Int'l Inc. 
MacDonald Assocs. Inc. v. Crownmark Corp. 
Chemlawn Servs. Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc. 
American Antenna Corp. v. Wilson Antenna, Inc. 
Designs for Leisure Ltd. v. Murrey & Sons Co. 
CITATION 
230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68 
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 
690 F. Supp. 1560 
690 F. Supp. 924 
9 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1159 
COURr 
C.D. Cal. 
D.R.I. 
S.D. Tex. 
D.Nev. 
C.D. Cal 
YEAR P.I. 
1986 1 
1987 0 
1988 1 
1988 1 
1988 1 
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TABLE 2 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURI'S (Jan. 1,1986 to April 19, 1989) 
DESIGN 
PAT. NO. CASE NAME CITATION COURI' 
N.D. Ill. 
N.D. Ill. 
c.n. Cal. 
C.D. Cal. 
E.D. Tenn. 
C.D. Cal. 
C.D. Cal. 
W.D.Ark. 
w.n. Ark. 
C.D. Cal. 
E.D. Mich. 
S.n.N.Y. 
YEAR VAL* INF** ENF*** 
1. 272,476 
2. 243,551 
3. 260,432 
4. 277,489 
5. 259,142 
6. 284,420 
7. 287,301 
8. 288,412 
9. 293,422 
10. 284,752 
11. 281,968 
12. 299,081 
Black & Decker Inc. v. Pittway Corp. 
FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc. 
Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co. 
Pioneer Photo Albums, Inc. v. Holson Co. 
Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. 
Pensa Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc. 
Pensa Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc. 
Nunes v. Bishop Aviation Inc. 
Nunes v. Bishop Aviation Inc. 
DTA Corp. v. J & J Enters. 
Schreiber Mfg. Co. v. Saft Am., Inc. 
L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co. 
* 1 = held valid ** 1 = held infringed 
636 F. Supp. 1193 
650 F. Supp. 688 
654 F. Supp. 90 
654 F. Supp. 87 
. 666 F. Supp. 1072 
4 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1016 
4 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1016 
703 F. Supp. 774 
703 F. Supp. 774 
715 F. Supp. 290 
704 F. Supp. 759 
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1001 
*** 1 = held enforceable 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1989 
1989 
o = held invalid o = held not infringed o = held unenforceable 
- = no ruling on validity - = no ruling on infringement - = no ruling on enforceability 
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TABLE 3 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (Jan. 1, 1986 to April 19, 1989) 
DESIGN 
PAT. NO. CASE NAME CITATION YEAR VAL* 
1. 267,927 Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co. 785 F.2d 1026 1986 
2. 258,100 Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp. 800 F.2d 1111 1986 1 
3. 258,101 Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp. . 800 F.2d 1111 1986 1 
4. 243,551 FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc. 836 F.2d 521 1987 
5. 259,142 Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. 838 F.2d 1186 1988 
6. 284,420 Avia Group In1'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc. 853 F.2d 1557 1988 1 
7. 287,301 Avia Group In1'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc. 853 F.2d 1557 1988 1 
* 1 = held valid ** 1 = held infringed *** 1 = held enforceable 
o = held invalid o = held not infringed o = held unenforceable 
- = no ruling on validity - = no ruling on infringement - = no ruling on enforceability 
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